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Abstract
In some sentences, demonstratives can be substituted with definite de-
scriptions without any change in meaning. In light of this, many have
maintained that demonstratives are just a type of definite description.
However, several theorists have drawn attention to a range of cases where
definite descriptions are acceptable, but their demonstrative counterparts
are not. Some have tried to account for this data by appealing to presup-
position. I argue that such presuppositional approaches are problematic,
and present a pragmatic account of the target contrasts. On this approach,
demonstratives take two arguments and generally require that the first,
covert argument is non-redundant with respect to the second, overt argu-
ment. I derive this condition through an economy principle discussed by
Schlenker (2005).
1 Introduction
Conventional semantics for demonstratives maintain that they are devices of ‘di-
rect reference’, and that demonstratives refer to specific individuals or objects.1
This theory is motivated by cases such as the following:
(1) [Pointing at Pete] That man plays tennis.
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1See, e.g., (Kaplan, 1989).
1
On the direct reference approach, the demonstrative in (1) acts like a name and
refers to the individual that I’m pointing at, namely Pete. Since (1) does seem
to mean the same as ‘Pete plays tennis’, examples such as this do appear to
support the direct reference semantics.
However, assuming that ‘that’ is not ambiguous, several theorists have ob-
served that there are other uses of demonstratives that make trouble for this
simple picture:
(2) [Pointing to a copy of On Denoting ] That man was a genius.
(3) Mary talked to no senator without declaring afterwards that that
senator was the one who would sponsor her bill (Elbourne, 2008, 445).
(4) Every father dreads that moment when his oldest child leaves home
(King, 2001, 10).
(5) Every man who owns a donkey beats that donkey (Elbourne, 2008, 446).
In (2), the speaker gestures towards an article but intends to talk about its
author. This is a case of so-called “deferred ostension”. Still more problematic
are (3)-(5): in none of these cases is the demonstrative referring to a particular
object. In (3) the whole demonstrative is bound by a higher quantifier, and in
(4) the pronoun in the matrix of the demonstrative is being bound by a quantifier
outside of it (a so-called “quantifying in” use). Meanwhile, the demonstrative
in (5) takes a “donkey anaphoric” reading.2
Theorists have tried to construct unified accounts of demonstratives that are
able to accommodate all of (1)-(5). One popular approach is to treat demonstra-
tives as a certain type of definite description. To illustrate, on such approaches
(2) and (4) are roughly equivalent to (6) and (7), respectively:
2See (Nowak, 2014) for a good discussion of non-deictic uses of demonstratives and the
threat they pose to the direct reference approach. Also see §5.3 for further discussion of
donkey anaphoric demonstratives.
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(6) The man who wrote the book I’m pointing to was a genius.
(7) Every father dreads the moment when his oldest child leaves home.
These descriptivist paraphrases do seem to mean the same as the original sen-
tences.
However, an important challenge for descriptivists is how they account for
cases where pthat Fq and pthe Fq are not interchangeable. There are two
types of case to consider. First, when demonstratives are acceptable but their
definite counterparts are not. Suppose I think that Plato was smarter than
Aristotle. Standing in front of The School of Athens I say:
(8) (a) That man [pointing to Plato] was a lot smarter than that man
[pointing to Aristotle].
(b) ?? The man [pointing to Plato] was a lot smarter than ?? the man
[pointing to Aristotle].3
Although (8 a) is acceptable, (8 b) is not. This is surprising if demonstratives
are just definite descriptions.
The second type of case involves sentences where descriptions are acceptable
but their demonstrative counterparts are not. Consider the following minimal
pairs:
(9) (a) The author of Blood Meridian also wrote The Road .
(b) ?? That author of Blood Meridian also wrote The Road [adapted
from (Nowak, 2014, 427)].4
(10) [We’re doing a head-count of all of the students on a particular floor
of our building, and we walk into a classroom.]
3King (2001) discusses contrasts like this. This particular case is inspired by King (2001,
71-72).
4Wolter (2006) and Nowak (2018) discuss similar contrasts.
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(a) The only student is Mike.
(b) ?? That only student is Mike.5
(11) [We are at a horse race, and have just seen Money Pony win]
(a) The fastest horse won the race.
(b) ?? That fastest horse won the race.6
(12) [We have just heard that an important boxing match has just
concluded, though we do not know who the participants were.]
(a) The winner will receive a lot of money.
(b) ?? That winner will receive a lot of money.
Although the (a) sentence in each pair is acceptable, the (b) sentence is not.
What these cases seem to show is that, unlike definite descriptions, a demon-
strative pthat Fq is unacceptable when F is known to apply to exactly one
individual in context. Once again, this contrast is surprising if demonstratives
are just disguised definite descriptions.
There is, then, the following challenge for theories of demonstratives: they
must explain how demonstratives can sometimes be virtually semantically equiv-
alent to definite descriptions (as in (4)), but also how the meaning of pthat Fq
and pthe Fq can come apart (as in (8 a)-(8 b) and (9 a)-(9 b)). In this pa-
per, I focus on cases where descriptions are acceptable but their demonstrative
counterparts are not, and in particular on contrasts exhibited by pairs such as
(9 a)-(9 b).7 I try to explain these contrasts from within a broadly descriptivist
5As far as I am aware, this contrast has not been discussed before. This is particularly
striking given how much attention has been paid to the contrast between ‘the only’ and ‘an
only’ (Herdan & Sharvit, 2006; Coppock & Beaver, 2015).
6Wolter (2006), Hawthorne & Manley (2012) and Nowak (2014, 2018) also discuss contrasts
involving superlatives.
7I will have little to say about cases where demonstratives are acceptable but their definite
counterparts are not, e.g. (8 a)-(8 b). See King (2001) for a more detailed discussion of such
cases.
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framework. I argue that demonstratives take an additional, covert argument,
and that the function of this covert argument is to pick out a particular individ-
ual from the set of individuals that satisfy the demonstrative’s overt argument. I
posit a non-redundancy condition on this covert argument: the demonstrative’s
overt argument cannot already denote a singleton in context, i.e. its covert
argument cannot be otiose. This explains why, e.g., (9 b) is unacceptable: the
overt predicate ‘author of Blood Meridian’ already denotes a singleton at the
actual world; there is nothing left for the covert argument to do.
Hawthorne & Manley (2012) and Nowak (2018) also posit a non-redundancy
condition on demonstratives (though they do not not formulate the condition in
the terms above). What is distinctive about my approach is the way in which I
implement this condition. More specifically, I put forward a pragmatic account
that ultimately derives the condition through an economy principle discussed by
Schlenker (2005). By contrast, Hawthorne & Manley (2012) and Nowak (2018)
try to capture non-redundancy semantically through a presupposition. I argue
that my account improves on these presuppositional approaches.8
Let me be clear about the target of our discussion. Our focus will be on
demonstratives that feature an overt noun phrase, so-called ‘complex demon-
stratives’ or ‘descriptive demonstratives’, rather than demonstratives that do
not, so-called ‘bare demonstratives’ or ‘demonstrative pronouns’. This is not
because the latter are less interesting than the former. Like complex demonstra-
tives, bare demonstratives can be used in various ways. For instance, consider
(13) and (14) below:
(13) [Pointing to a clock on the wall] That has started to run slow.
(14) Every man who owns a donkey beats that and nothing else (Elbourne,
8In what follows I assume that presupposition is a semantic phenomenon that can be
captured in a trivalent system. However, this is mainly for simplicity—all of my arguments
are compatible with a pragmatic approach to presuppositions, e.g. (Schlenker, 2008, 2009).
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2008, 446).
However, bare demonstratives raise difficulties that I do not have the space to
consider here. For instance, using a bare demonstrative to pick out a human
subject is often infelicitous. For example, it is unacceptable to point at Noam
Chomsky and utter (15)-(16):
(15) ?? That wrote Syntactic Structures.
(16) ?? That is an emeritus professor at MIT.
However, I can point at Noam Chomsky and utter (17)-(18):
(17) That is the father of modern linguistics.
(18) That is Noam Chomsky.
Any adequate theory of demonstratives should explain these contrasts.9 Since
complex demonstratives provide quite enough to keep us occupied, a full treat-
ment of bare demonstratives will have to wait for another day.10
The paper is structured as follows. In §2 I make explicit some of my back-
ground semantic assumptions. Then in §3 I present the non-redundancy con-
dition on demonstratives and explain how it allows us to capture the target
contrasts. In §§4-5 I consider two implementations of the non-redundancy condi-
tion: the semantic, presuppositional approaches of Hawthorne & Manley (2012)
and Nowak (2018); and my preferred pragmatic account. §6 considers what
is arguably the most sophisticated theory of demonstratives in the literature,
9Similar contrasts are discussed by Yalcin (2014), who attributes them to Mikkelsen (2004).
10I will also put to one side so-called “emotive” uses of demonstratives, which are often
compatible with semantically unique descriptive content, e.g. (19):
(19) That mother of John Smith is quite a woman! [Wolter (2006) inspired by Lakoff
(1974)]
Such uses of demonstratives raise puzzles that I cannot address here. See (Wolter, 2006) for
further discussion.
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namely the account of Elbourne (2008). I show that Elbourne’s semantics on
its own is not able to capture the target contrasts, and needs to be supple-
mented with a pragmatic story like the one I develop earlier in the paper. §7
concludes.11
2 Preliminaries
Before I try to explain the target contrasts, I want to make explicit some fea-
tures of the framework in which our discussion will be set. More specifically,
the mechanism by which implicit content is associated with determiner phrases
(DPs) in context (§2.1), as well as my chosen background semantics for definite
descriptions (§2.2).
11I do not consider the descriptivist proposals of King (2001), Roberts (2002) or Wolter
(2006) in detail in this paper. Elbourne (2008) provides a detailed, critical discussion of
both King (2001) and Roberts (2002), so perhaps saying more about them is unnecessary
here. But I will add a few brief remarks. Since King ties the denotation of a demonstrative
to the speaker’s intentions, it is clear that his theory, as it stands, cannot account for the
relevant contrasts (this point is also observed by Nowak (2014, 428, fn.25)). For instance,
supposing that the speaker has the intention to talk about whoever wrote Blood Meridian,
King’s theory cannot explain why (9 b) is unacceptable. However, like Elbourne’s theory,
it is not implausible that King’s theory could be supplemented with the sort of pragmatic
account that I develop in §5. As for the accounts of Roberts and Wolter, neither appear to
have the empirical reach of Elbourne’s account. More specifically, it is unclear how Roberts
could account for cases such as (4). When a demonstrative is not being used deictically (as in
(1)) Roberts requires that it has an accompanying linguistic antecedent in discourse (so-called
“discourse deictic” demonstratives) (Roberts, 2002, 122-123). But the demonstrative in (4)
has no accompanying linguistic antecedent. So, in order to handle all of the relevant data,
Roberts’s conditions need to be relaxed. One might try to amend her account by allowing
that no accompanying linguistic antecedent is needed when the relevant entity is “weakly
familiar”: when the existence of the entity referred to is evident to the participants in the
discourse, for example by direct perception or deduction from things that have been said, even
though it has not been mentioned (Roberts, 2002, 24). It is arguable that this amendment
would handle a sentence such as (4). However, the observation in fn.24 below implies that
even if my car is weakly familiar in context, (34 b) is infelicitous. As for Wolter, it is unclear
how she could account for (3). Wolter works within a framework which assigns predicates
situation variables that determine where the predicate is to be evaluated. She requires that
the situation variable assigned to the argument of the demonstrative determiner be free in
the relevant sentence (Wolter, 2006, 64). But quantified cases such as (3) involve binding the
situation variable associated with the argument of the determiner. It is unclear how to revise
Wolter’s account to solve this problem (also see §6 for a more general problem with this sort
of binding).
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2.1 Implicit content
Consider the following:
(20) [We are in a room with only one table]
The table is covered with books.
(21) [We have just finished grading a history exam]
Every student passed.
Intuitively, each DP is restricted by more than just the relevant overt predicate
material: the full meaning of (20) is closer to ‘The table in this room is covered
with books’, while the full meaning of (21) is closer to ‘Every student in this
history class passed’. That is, there is implicit content associated with certain
DPs when they are used in context.
I will assume that implicit content is captured by unpronounced elements
in the syntactic structures of sentences, i.e. I assume that implicit content is
captured by covert material at the level of logical form. Moreover, I will assume
that these unpronounced elements modify, or are associated with, nouns rather
than determiners.12
There are several ways of developing an account of implicit content that sat-
isfies these assumptions, e.g. (Percus, 2000), (Stanley & Szabo´, 2000), (Stanley,
2002), and (Elbourne, 2013). For our purposes it will not matter which partic-
ular theory is adopted. However, it will be helpful to have something concrete
to work with. So, since it is fairly straightforward, I will assume that implicit
content is captured by covert variables that appear on nouns. What this means
is that these variables are unpronounced and so have no phonological mani-
festation; but nevertheless they appear at logical form and so are semantically
12See (Stanley, 2002) and (Elbourne, 2013) for some arguments in defense of these assump-
tions.
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relevant. Semantically, it is assumed that the denotation of this silent variable
is intersected with the semantic value of its sister noun. For instance, (20) can
be represented as follows:
(22) The 〈table V〉 is covered with books
The angled brackets around ‘table V’ indicates that the variable V is associated
with the noun ‘table’ (Stanley & Szabo´, 2000, 251). V is assigned the set of
individuals in the relevant room by the contextually determined assignment
function. The semantic value of ‘table’, i.e. the set of tables, is then intersected
with the semantic value of V. The sentence ends up meaning ‘The table in this
room is covered with books’ in context, as required.13
2.2 Definite descriptions
It will be helpful to have an account of definite descriptions on the table. There
are various analyses of descriptions in the literature, and it doesn’t really matter
which we choose.14 Since it is fairly straightforward, I will give ‘the’ a Fregean
analysis.15 This means that the definite article takes one argument of noun-
phrase type:
(23) [the N ]16
13What has been presented here is a (harmless) simplification in two respects. First, I
assume that the semantic value of the covert variable is a set. But this means that, relative to
a context, the covert variable will rigidly designate its value, which is problematic (Stanley &
Szabo´, 2000, 252). For this reason, the semantic value of the variable is better treated as an
intensional entity such as a property, rather than a set. Second, in order to handle quantified
cases, the covert structure will likely need to be more complex than simply a set/property
variable. See (Stanley & Szabo´, 2000) and (Hawthorne & Manley, 2012, ch.4.5) for further
discussion.
14As far as I can tell, my account of the target contrasts doesn’t hang on which particular
semantics for descriptions we adopt. For instance, we could have chosen a broadly Russellian,
quantificational account. See (Coppock & Beaver, 2015) for a survey of the various semantics
available here.
15The lexical entry to follow is similar to the one presented in (Heim & Kratzer, 1998). Also
see (Elbourne, 2013) for a thorough discussion of the Fregean analysis of definite descriptions.
16N is not itself a noun-phrase, since it is a complex made up of a noun-phrase and the
variable V. However, given our assumptions above regarding this variable, N will have the
type of a noun-phrase.
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Semantically, ‘the’ is given the following lexical entry:
(24) JtheK = λf ∈ D<e,t> : there is exactly one x such that f(x) =
1. the unique y such that f(y) = 117
On this account, Jthe F K is defined just in case there is exactly one thing to
which F applies; and if there is exactly one thing to which F applies, it denotes
this very individual. Otherwise, the description will have no semantic value.
Definite descriptions effectively trigger a presupposition that there is exactly
one thing to which F applies. For instance, (22) carries a presupposition that
there is a unique table in the relevant room, and it is true just in case that
object is covered with books.
Since it will be important later on, let me say a bit more about how I am
thinking about presuppositions. As is common, I assume that sentences are
evaluated against a conversational background that represents the information
that interlocutors take for granted in a conversation. Moreover, I assume that
this information can be modeled by a set of possible worlds: the context set.
The context set is the set of worlds that as far as the interlocutors are concerned
are candidates for the actual world.
A natural way of handling presuppositions in this framework is through a
satisfaction theory (Stalnaker, 1978). The idea is that sentences that carry
presuppositions put constraints on the context set: if a sentence S carries a
presupposition p then S can be used to say something true (or false) only if
every world in the context set is a p-world, i.e. every world in the context set
is one in which p is true. Thus, a sentence that carries a presupposition is
felicitous only if every world in the context set satisfies that presupposition. So,
17The lambda binder ‘λ’ is a device for forming functions. More specifically, a lambda-term
pλα : φ. δq is to be understood as “the smallest function which maps every α satisfying φ to
δ”. φ is the domain condition, and is introduced by a colon; while δ is the value description,
and is introduced by a period. See (Heim & Kratzer, 1998, ch.2.5) for further discussion.
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(22) will be felicitous only if every world in the context set is one in which there
is a unique table in the relevant room.
3 Non-redundancy
In this section, I introduce a non-redundancy condition on demonstratives and
show how it accounts for the target contrasts. In the following two sections,
I present two ways of implementing this condition and argue that the second
approach is superior (§§4-5).
Recall that we are trying to explain contrasts such as the following:
(9 a) The author of Blood Meridian also wrote The Road .
(9 b) ??That author of Blood Meridian also wrote The Road .
As already mentioned in §1, what is striking about cases such as this is that
the nominal associated with the demonstrative is known to denote a singleton.
Although definite descriptions can be used felicitously here, demonstratives can-
not. A demonstrative pthat Fq seems to require that F is not known to denote
a singleton: its “job” seems to be to whittle down this non-singleton set to a
single member.
A natural way of making sense of this “whittling down” idea is to maintain
that demonstratives, unlike descriptions, take two arguments of noun-phrase
type:
(25) [[that X] N ]
The first argument, X, is covert. What this means is that this argument is un-
pronounced and has no phonological manifestation. Nevertheless, this argument
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is present at logical form, and is therefore semantically relevant.18 The second
argument, N , is tied to overt material in the sense that the noun it contains is
overt. For this reason I will call N the demonstrative’s overt argument. How-
ever, the noun inside N is sister to the covert variable that provides implicit
content. So, just to be clear, I am proposing that demonstratives involve (at
least) two sorts of covert structure: a covert argument X, as well as a covert
variable V that appears in the overt argument. Semantically, I propose that
demonstratives trigger (at least) a presupposition that exactly one object satis-
fies both the demonstrative determiner’s overt and covert arguments. If defined,
I will assume that a complex demonstrative denotes this very individual.
To handle the target contrasts, the general thought is that felicitous use of a
demonstrative involves a non-redundancy condition: the covert argument needs
to be non-redundant with respect to the overt argument in the sense that the
overt argument cannot already denote a singleton at every world in the context
set. In short, the covert argument cannot be idle.
In the next two subsections I will consider two ways of implementing the
non-redundancy condition. But notice that however it is spelled out it allows
us to capture the target contrasts. For instance, the demonstrative in (9 b)
can be represented as follows, where X is a placeholder for the relevant covert
argument:
(26) [[that X] 〈author of Blood Meridian V〉]
No matter what the value of V is in context, ‘〈author of Blood Meridian V〉’
will denote either a singleton or the empty set at each world in the context
set, since it is common knowledge that only one person wrote Blood Meridian
at the actual world. If it denotes a singleton at each world in the context set,
18‘X’ is intended to be a placeholder for a syntactic structure, e.g. a noun-phrase. I have
presented things this way because I want to remain neutral on how exactly this argument is
represented at logical form.
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then the non-redundancy condition isn’t satisfied and (9 b) is predicted to be
infelicitous. Otherwise, for some world w in the context set, ‘〈author of Blood
Meridian V〉’ denotes the empty set at w. Thus, it is not the case that exactly
one object satisfies both X and ‘〈author of Blood Meridian V〉’ at w. So, the
presupposition triggered by the demonstrative will not be satisfied, in which
case (9 b) is again predicted to be infelicitous. In any event, (9 b) should be
unacceptable.
As for (10 a)-(10 b), the demonstrative in (10 b) (‘That only student is Mike’)
can be represented like this:
(27) [[that X] [only 〈student V〉]]
I will follow Coppock & Beaver (2012, 535) and assume that adjectival ‘only’
has roughly the following meaning:
(28) JonlyK = λf ∈ D<e,t>. λx ∈ De. f(x) = 1 ∧ ∀y[y 6= x ⊃ f(y) 6= 1]19
That is, ponly Fq holds of an individual x just in case x is an individual to
which F applies, and no other individual is a thing to which F applies. Suppose
that ‘〈student V〉’ denotes a singleton at every world in the context set. Then
‘only 〈student V〉’ denotes a singleton at every world in the context set and
the non-redundancy condition is not satisfied. Thus, (10 b) is predicted to be
unacceptable. Otherwise, for some world w in the context set, ‘〈student V〉’
does not denote a singleton at w, so ‘only 〈student V〉’ denotes the empty set
at w. In this case, the presupposition triggered by the demonstrative will not
be satisfied, and (10 b) is also predicted to be unacceptable. This explains why
pthat only Fq is always unacceptable.20
19The condition f(x) = 1 is usually treated as a definedness condition rather than a “mere
entailment”, but this won’t make a difference for our purposes.
20A similar explanation can be be given for the unacceptability of demonstratives involving
superlatives, such as (11 b) (‘That fastest horse won the race’) from §1. This result is obtained
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Finally, if the demonstrative’s overt argument in (12 b) (‘That winner will
receive a lot of money’) means something like ‘winner of the relevant fight’ in
context, then the non-redundancy condition will not be satisfied given that it is
common knowledge that there was only one winner. Thus, (12 b) is predicted
to be unacceptable. Notice that unlike (9 b) and (10 b), (12 b) is acceptable
in other settings. Consider, for instance, a scenario where we are watching a
draw for a large cash prize, all of whose contestants are past bingo winners.
Once the outcome of the draw has been made manifest, (12 b) can be uttered
felicitously. Here it means something like ‘That past bingo winner will receive
a lot of money’.
In summary, the non-redundancy condition does a good job of explaining
the relevant contrasts. Now we will consider some ways of implementing the
condition. First, I consider a semantic approach that sees the condition as a
presupposition (Hawthorne & Manley, 2012; Nowak, 2018); and then I consider
a pragmatic approach that ultimately derives the condition through an economy
principle discussed by Schlenker (2005). I argue that there is good reason to
favor the latter account.
4 First approach: non-redundancy as presuppo-
sition
4.1 Nowak (2018)
A natural thought is that the non-redundancy condition should be captured as
a constraint on definedness and thus as part of the presupposition introduced by
if, e.g., pfastest Fq holds of an individual x just in case x is the fastest thing to which F
applies (so that pfastest Fq denotes, at most, a singleton). The result is also obtained if a
more sophisticated entry for superlatives is used, e.g. that given by Herdan & Sharvit (2006)
(see fn.38 for further discussion).
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the demonstrative.21 This is essentially the approach favored by Nowak (2018).
On his account the entry for ‘that’ can be presented as follows:22
(29) JthatK =
λf ∈ D<e,t>. λg ∈ D<e,t> : there is exactly one x such that f(x) =
g(x) = 1 ∧ there is not exactly one x such that g(x) =
1. the unique y such that f(y) = g(y) = 1
The first argument to the determiner is covert, while the second is tied to overt
material. On this account, a demonstrative is defined just in case a unique
object satisfies both its overt and covert argument, and its overt argument does
not denote a singleton without help from its covert argument. If defined, the
complex demonstrative denotes this object. Thus, a demonstrative pthat Fq
triggers a presupposition that F does not denote a singleton. So, pthat Fq can
be used felicitously relative to a context set C only if every world w in C is such
that F does not denote a singleton at w.
Although this account can capture the relevant contrasts from §1, making the
non-redundancy condition presuppositional is problematic. This can be brought
out by considering the coherence of the following:
(30) (a) I don’t know if there are any other cars in this showroom, but
[pointing to a particular car] that car looks expensive.
21Although intuitions about these matters are rather delicate, I take the initial motivation
for maintaining that non-redundancy is a constraint on definedness rather than a “mere en-
tailment” to be the feeling that nothing is “said” when this condition is not satisfied (but see
the arguments immediately below).
22On Nowak’s account, the covert argument is the second argument to the determiner,
rather than the first. Although this difference is significant when it comes to demonstratives
that feature postnominal modifiers (see §5.3), it isn’t relevant when we restrict our focus to
the target contrasts. Moreover, presenting things as in (29) will be more convenient when it
comes to discussing my preferred account in §5.2.
It is worth mentioning that Nowak does not provide an account of implicit content; nor does
he explicitly discuss what role implicit content plays with respect to the non-redundancy con-
dition. However, some of his remarks suggest that it is contextually enriched overt predicate
material that forms the second argument of the determiner. This is as what we are assuming
here. Whether Nowak would endorse all of our assumptions outlined in §2.1 is unclear, but
they do appear to be compatible with his general framework.
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(b) I don’t know if there’s only one person dressed as a witch at this
Halloween party, but [pointing to someone dressed as a witch] that
witch is very tall.
(c) I don’t know if there’s only one sandwich in this food truck, but
[pointing to a sandwich] that sandwich looks delicious.
(30 a)-(30 c) are all acceptable, but this is unexpected if the non-redundancy
condition was a presupposition. Usually when a speaker expresses doubt that a
certain condition holds and then utters a sentence that has that condition as a
presupposition, infelicity results. Consider:
(31) (a) # I don’t know if France is a monarchy, but the King of France is
bald.
(b) # I don’t know if Mary ever smoked, but Mary stopped smoking.
(c) # I don’t know if Mark played tennis this morning, but Mark wrote
to Mary before he played tennis this morning.
We can explain the infelicity of these sentences as follows. The first conjunct
of, e.g. (31 a), signals that the speaker is ignorant about whether France is a
monarchy. Since the context models information that is common to interlocu-
tors, this implies that that not every world in the context set is one where France
is a monarchy. However, the second conjunct in (31 a) presupposes that France
is a monarchy (through the definite ‘the King of France’), and thus requires that
every world in the context set be one in which France is a monarchy. The result
is that (31 a) should be infelicitous, as we observe.
But now consider (30 a)-(30 c). In these cases the speaker explicitly signals
their ignorance as to whether the overt material for the demonstrative denotes
a singleton. Consequently, the context set does not satisfy this condition ei-
ther. However, in each case the second conjunct is perfectly felicitous. This
16
strongly suggests that the non-redundancy condition should not be modeled as
a presupposition, and that the entry in (29) is incorrect.23
4.2 Hawthorne & Manley (2012)
Before considering my preferred implementation of the non-redundancy condi-
tion, I want to briefly discuss another account that is similar to Nowak’s. This
is the theory of Hawthorne & Manley.
According to Hawthorne & Manley (2012, 203-218), specific indefinites (pa/an
(specific) Fq), definite descriptions and demonstratives are all existential quan-
tifiers. However, these expressions differ in terms of the presuppositions
they carry. For demonstratives, they also posit something similar to a non-
redundancy condition. But they tie this condition to the mechanism that pro-
vides implicit content to DPs in context. In terms of our assumptions about
implicit content, they maintain that a sentence such as (33 a) can be represented
as in (33 b):
(33) (a) That table is covered with books.
(b) [[That 〈table V〉] [is covered with books]]
On Hawthorne & Manley’s account, (33 b) presupposes that ‘〈table V〉’ denotes
a singleton in context, but ‘table’ does not. More generally, demonstratives
23Presuppositions that are not satisfied by the context set can sometimes be “accommo-
dated”, e.g. even if it is not common knowledge that I have a sister I can say ‘I’m visiting
my sister this weekend’. However, I take it that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to ac-
commodate a presupposition once the speaker has signaled their ignorance as to whether the
presupposition is satisfied.
Interestingly, as Schoubye (2011, 160, fn.6) notes, examples such as (31 a)-(31 c) are im-
proved when the second conjunct is embedded in the antecedent of a conditional:
(32) (a) I don’t know if France is a monarchy, but if the King of France is bald, then...
(b) I don’t know if Mary ever smoked, but if Mary stopped smoking, then...
Why there should be this contrast is unclear. Schoubye suggests that the contrast marker
‘but’ license “local accommodation” here so that the antecedent is interpreted at a possible
world where the presupposition is satisfied. Whatever the correct explanation of this fact is,
accommodation doesn’t seem to be available in (31 a)-(31 c).
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trigger a presupposition that their first argument (e.g. ‘〈table V〉’) denotes a
singleton, but that the relevant overt noun-phrase (e.g. ‘table’) does not denote
a singleton without help from the covert variable (V).24
Hawthorne & Manley’s account can explain why (9 b) (‘That author of Blood
Meridian also wrote The Road ’) is unacceptable. Since the overt predicate ‘au-
thor of Blood Meridian’ already denotes a singleton, (9 b) is predicted to be
infelicitous. However, Hawthorne & Manley’s account suffers from the problem
outlined for Nowak’s approach: if non-redundancy is captured in terms of pre-
suppositions, then the felicity conditions of demonstratives will be too strict.
Moreover, it seems difficult to implement the account compositionally: ‘that’
will have to somehow look “inside” its NP argument to know what to yield as
a value. Finally, since it relies on the mechanism that provides implicit content
to DPs in context, the account cannot explain why demonstratives are unac-
ceptable when the relevant overt predicate only denotes a singleton in com-
bination with covert material. Consider (10 b) (‘That only student is Mike’),
(11 b) (‘That fastest horse won the race’), and (12 b) (‘That winner will receive
a lot of money’) from §1. Clearly, none of ‘only student’, ‘fastest horse’ or ‘win-
ner’ denotes a singleton without covert supplementation. But this means that
Hawthorne & Manley cannot explain why these sentences are unacceptable in
context.25
In summary: in terms of the contrasts that we are interested in, Hawthorne
& Manley’s account does not improve on Nowak’s presuppositional approach
that I presented in §4.1.26
24Hawthorne & Manley also maintain that covert material supplied by the covert variable
must be salient. This is supposed to explain the contrast between (34 a) and (34 b) when both
are uttered discourse initially and without any associated demonstrations:
(34) (a) I took the car to the garage last night.
(b) I took ??that car to the garage last night (Hawthorne & Manley, 2012, 209).
Even if the audience can exploit a background assumption that the speaker has only one car,
if no car is salient then there will be no salient covert material to restrict the denotation of
the overt noun-phrase ‘car’. In this case, (34 b) is predicted to be infelicitous.
25Note that in each case we can make the covert material as salient as we like, e.g. by
pointing to the relevant objects—this makes no difference to (un)acceptability.
26In fairness to Hawthorne & Manley, after giving their account they say ‘no doubt this
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5 Second approach: non-redundancy as econ-
omy
We have just seen that maintaining that the non-redundancy condition has a
semantic basis is problematic. Instead, I want to suggest that it has a pragmatic
source. The basic idea is that demonstratives are in competition with definite
descriptions: a demonstrative may not be used if a definite can be. What drives
this competition is an economy principle. I unpack and motivate these thoughts
over the course of this section.
5.1 Minimize Restrictors!27
Schlenker (2005) draws attention to contrasts such as the following:
(35) (a) John’s father has arrived
(b) ?? John’s blond father has arrived
(36) (a) The American president is in the next room
(b) ?? The educated American president is in the next room
(37) [We all know that there was exactly one witch at John’s Halloween
party]
(a) The witch left early
(b) ?? The tall witch left early
The (b) member of each pair sounds worse than the (a) member. Intuitively,
this is because the definite description in these sentences contains redundant
sketch is inadequate’ (Hawthorne & Manley, 2012, 209).
27Thanks to both Cian Dorr and Philippe Schlenker for independently drawing my attention
to (Schlenker, 2005) and the principle of Minimize Restrictors!
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material, e.g. ‘tall’ in (37 b) could be dropped without affecting the denotation
of the description. These observations motivate Schlenker (2005, 7) to introduce
the following principle, which he calls Minimize Restrictors! :
(38) Minimize Restrictors!28
Relative to a context set C, a definite description the A B is deviant if A
is redundant, i.e. if:
(i) the B is grammatical and B denotes a singleton at every world in C,
and
(ii) A does not serve another purpose, i.e. it is pragmatically irrelevant.
Condition (ii) in (38) is there to handle the felicity of sentences such as ‘The
idiotic American president made another blunder’. The idea is that although
‘idiotic’ can be dropped without altering the denotation of the description, it
serves a “pragmatic” function in the sense that it helps to express the speaker’s
opinion of the American president.29
Schlenker (2005, 4) suggests that what drives Minimize Restrictors! are con-
siderations of economy : ‘Minimize Restrictors! is presumably a special case of
a Gricean principle, probably what Levinson (1998) calls the “Maxim of Min-
imization”, which he states as the following injunction: Produce the minimal
linguistic clues sufficient to achieve your communicational ends’. To be com-
plete, it should be shown how precisely Minimize Restrictors! can be derived.
But we will not do that here. Instead, I will just assume Minimize Restric-
tors! and see how it helps us account for the non-redundancy condition on
demonstratives.30
28My formulation of Minimize Restrictors! varies slightly from Schlenker’s, but as far as I
can tell these differences are not significant.
29There is clearly much more to be said about condition (ii). For instance, even if ‘stupid’ has
an expressive function, ‘The stupid only student is angry’ is still unacceptable. See (Blumberg,
2018) for further discussion of this issue. Also see (Marty, 2017) for a more general discussion
of condition (ii).
30One might think that Minimize Restrictors! could be derived from the sort of general
redundancy principles that have been discussed by Fox (2007); Singh (2011); Mayr & Romoli
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5.2 pthat Fq and pthe X Fq
This is the simple semantics for demonstratives that I propose:
(39) JthatK =
λf ∈ D<e,t>. λg ∈ D<e,t> : there is exactly one x such that f(x) =
g(x) = 1. the unique y such that f(y) = g(y) = 1
Once again, the first argument to the determiner is covert, while the second is
tied to overt material. On this account, a demonstrative is defined just in case
a unique object satisfies both its overt and covert argument. If defined, the
complex demonstrative denotes this object.
What the above entry does, essentially, is make a demonstrative pthat Fq
equivalent to a definite description pthe X Fq, where X is the covert argument
(2016); and Blumberg (2017). For instance, these authors appeal to principles such as the
following: φ cannot be used in context C if φ and ψ have the same assertive content relative
to C , and ψ is a simplification of φ (ψ is a simplification of φ if ψ can be derived from φ
by replacing nodes in φ with their subconstituents). Assertive strength is commonly defined
as follows: clauses F and F’ have the same assertive content relative to C just in case
{w : F ′ is true in w} = {w : F is true in w}. However, although (36 a) is a simplification
of (36 b), even if is not commonly known that the American president is educated, (36 b) is
infelicitous. That is, (36 a) and (36 b) need not have the same assertive content relative to
C in order for (36 b) to be infelicitous. (See (Blumberg, 2018) for some reasons why, in this
case, the infelicity can’t be explained by simply maintaining that the presuppositions of (36 b)
aren’t satisfied.)
For a similar reason, Minimize Restrictors! cannot be derived from the principle of Maximize
Presupposition (Heim, 1991; Percus, 2006; Schlenker, 2012): if a sentence S is a presuppo-
sitional alternative of a sentence S’ and the context C is such that (i) the presuppositions
of S and S’ are satisfied in C ; (ii) S and S’ have the same assertive content relative to C ;
and (iii) S carries a stronger presupposition than S, then S should be preferred to S’ (this
formulation is due to Schlenker (2012, 393)). As Marty (2017) points out, pthe Bq does not
trigger stronger presuppositions than pthe A Bq. Presuppositional strength is commonly de-
fined as follows: a clause F carries a stronger presupposition than a clause F’ just in case
{w : F ′ is undefined in w} ( {w : F is undefined in w}. But now consider a world w with the
following features: |Aw| = 0, |Bw| = 1. At w, the presupposition triggered by pthe Bq will be
satisfied, but the presupposition triggered by pthe A Bq will not be.
Marty (2017, ch.3) tries to derive a principle similar to Minimize Restrictors! from a more
general theory of implicatures. However, in order to predict that (36 b) is infelicitous in
context, he requires that (36 b) and (36 a) be contextually equivalent. But as noted above, this
isn’t necessary for (36 b) to be unacceptable. (Also see fn.41 for further discussion of Marty’s
attempt to derive Minimize Restrictors!.) I suspect that Minimize Restrictors! is partly the
product of a principle recently discussed by Anvari (2018) called “Logical Integrity”, for this
would explain why pthe A B is Gq is infelicitous even when it isn’t contextually equivalent to
pthe B is Gq. However, this still leaves condition (ii) of Minimize Restrictors! unaccounted
for. See (Blumberg, 2018) for further discussion of this topic.
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to the demonstrative. Given Minimize Restrictors! discussed above, this is all
we need to explain the relevant contrasts. Let me expand on this. Minimize
Restrictors! tells us that pthe X Fq enters into competition with pthe Fq. I
claim that because pthat Fq and pthe X Fq are semantically equivalent, pthat
Fq also enters into competition with pthe Fq. This gives us the following
Competition Principle:
(40) Competition Principle
Relative to a context set C, a demonstrative that F is deviant if (where
X is the covert argument to the demonstrative):
(i) the F is grammatical and F denotes a singleton at every world in C
and
(ii) X does not serve another purpose, i.e. it is pragmatically irrelevant.
Ignoring condition (ii), which we will return to shortly, it is clear that the
Competition Principle implies the non-redundancy condition on demonstratives:
if F denotes a singleton at every world in the context set, then pthe Fq is
preferred, rendering pthat Fq infelicitous. This explains the contrasts from
above (repeated below):
(9 a) The author of Blood Meridian also wrote The Road .
(9 b) ??That author of Blood Meridian also wrote The Road .
(10 a) The only student is Mike.
(10 b) ?? That only student is Mike.
(12 a) The winner will receive a lot of money.
(12 b) ?? That winner will receive a lot of money.
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To reiterate, on the account I am proposing the (b) member in each pair is infe-
licitous because demonstratives and definites are in competition, and definites
are preferred to demonstratives. They are preferred, ultimately, for reasons of
economy: demonstratives take a covert argument making pthat Fq equivalent
to pthe X Fq, where X is covert. pthe Fq is more economical than pthe X Fq
when they have the same denotation. And they will have the same denotation
exactly when F denotes a singleton, as all of ‘author of Blood Meridian’, ‘only
student’, and ‘winner’ do in context.
Not only does this pragmatic approach explain the relevant contrasts, but it
also makes sense of data that was problematic for the account based on presup-
positions sketched above. The problem involved cases such as the following:
(30 b) I don’t know if there’s only one person dressed as a witch at this
Halloween party, but [pointing to someone dressed as a witch] that witch
is very tall.
On the presuppositional approach, felicitous use of a demonstrative pthat Fq
requires that every world in the context set be one in which F does not denote
a singleton. It follows that the speaker needs to believe that F does not denote
a singleton. By contrast, on the pragmatic approach we get something weaker.
By choosing to use a demonstrative pthat Fq, we may only infer that it is not
commonly believed that F denotes a singleton, for otherwise the speaker would
have used the definite pthe Fq. This weaker condition is of course compati-
ble with the first conjunct in (30 b): the speaker does not believe that ‘witch’
denotes a singleton. Thus, the pragmatic implementation of non-redundancy
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improves on the presuppositional approaches discussed in §4.31,32
Now that I have presented my favored explanation of the relevant contrasts, I
want to end this section by considering some possible challenges for my account.
5.3 Possible worries
First, let us return to the matter of condition (ii) of the Competition Principle.
It might be argued that the approach put forward predicts that pthat Fq can be
felicitous when F denotes a singleton. This should happen whenever condition
(ii) of the Competition Principle is contravened, i.e. the demonstrative’s covert
argument serves a pragmatic purpose. For instance, it seems to predict that
(42) should be acceptable when the covert argument for the demonstrative is
something like ‘idiotic’, since (43) is perfectly fine.
(42) ?? That American President is in the next room.
(43) The idiotic American President is in the next room.
But this is a bad prediction, for the demonstrative is not acceptable even if the
speaker holds a low opinion of the President.
31To be sure, use of a demonstrative does often communicate the stronger claim that it is
commonly believed that F does not denote a singleton. What this shows is that inferences
based on the Competition Principle are often strengthened through an “epistemic step” where
from ‘not B P’ one infers ‘B not P’, where B is a belief operator. A similar effect has
been observed for scalar implicatures (Sauerland, 2004), for so-called “antipresuppositions”
(Chemla, 2007), and for general redundancy-based inferences (Blumberg, 2017). I am hopeful
that the explanation for the epistemic step for antipresuppositions presented in (Chemla,
2007) can be applied to the Competition Principle, but this matter requires a more detailed
investigation.
32As a reviewer observes, the phenomenon of interest carries over to the plural case as well:
(41) [Mary has pictures of all Olympic 100m gold medalists and Olympic 200m gold
medalists.]
(a) The 100m gold medalists look fitter than the 200m gold medalists.
(b) ?? Those 100m gold medalists look fitter than ?? those 200m gold medalists.
As the reviewer notes, my account can explain such contrasts so long as we replace the
definite’s uniqueness presupposition with a maximality presupposition (Sharvy, 1980).
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In response, I claim that condition (ii) of the Competition Principle is hardly
ever contravened. The demonstrative’s covert argument will serve a pragmatic
purpose when it signals the speaker’s attitude towards the denotation of the
demonstrative. However, it is plausible that the argument being covert, or
unpronounced, forms a principled barrier to this sort of signaling. That is, in
order for predicative material to serve an expressive function, it generally needs
to be overt and manifest to the audience. Thus, it is in the nature of covert
material to not be able to fulfill an expressive function. Therefore, it is no
surprise that although (43) is acceptable, (42) is rarely felicitous. Note that
this response predicts that when the covert material is communicated by other
means, e.g. intonation, the demonstrative should improve. This does appear to
be what we find: when ‘that’ is emphasized in (42) and the sentence is uttered
in a haughty, supercilious way, it does seem to sound better.
Second, one might worry about cases where both demonstratives and definite
descriptions are acceptable. Consider the following context and sentences that
follow it:
Lone Car : We live in a neighborhood that forbids cars on its roads—residents
are encouraged to walk or ride bicycles. One day we wake up to find a white
Toyota parked outside our apartment. A while later you phone me from your
office to ask if anything’s changed. I reply:
(44) (a) The car is still parked outside our apartment.
(b) That car is still parked outside our apartment.
Both (44 a) and (44 b) are acceptable, but this is surprising given the Compe-
tition Principle: since the definite is acceptable, the demonstrative shouldn’t
be.33
33Thanks to Ben Holgu´ın for discussing this worry with me and inspiring this example.
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Observe that Minimize Restrictors! also appears to be contravened in the
context of Lone Car, for (45) is also an acceptable reply:
(45) The white car is still parked outside our apartment.
Given that ‘white’ doesn’t serve a pragmatic function, Minimize Restrictors!
seems to predict that (45) should be infelicitous.
A plausible response here is that the value of the silent variable V appearing on
the noun ‘car’ takes a different value in (44 a) and (44 b)-(45). More specifically,
while ‘〈car V〉’ denotes a singleton in (44 a), it does not denote a singleton in
(44 b)-(45). Since the Competition Principle (and Minimize Restrictors!) is
intended to take implicit content into account, there is no problem. Further
motivation for this sort of response comes from well known data that suggests
quantifier domains can shift rapidly and without speakers’ explicit awareness,
e.g. ‘Everyone is asleep and is being monitored by a research assistant’ and
‘Every sailor waved to every sailor’ (Westerst˚ahl, 1985; Soames, 1986; Stanley
& Szabo´, 2000).34
As an anonymous reviewer points out, many demonstratives that take a “don-
key anaphoric” reading can be substituted for their definite counterparts without
a change in acceptability, e.g. (46 a)-(46 b):
(46) (a) Every boy who danced with a girl kissed the girl.
34Note that the felicity of both (44 a) and (44 b) poses a problem for Hawthorne & Manley’s
account presented in §4.2, given the principle Maximize Presupposition: among a set of com-
petitors whose logical forms have the same assertive content relative to the context, choose
the one that marks the strongest presupposition (see fn.30 for a more detailed presentation of
this principle). On Hawthorne & Manley’s account the presuppositions of demonstratives are
stronger than the presuppositions of definite descriptions. On this theory, felicitous use of a
definite description presupposes that it is “candidly” restricted to a singleton, i.e. that ‘the
audience can grasp how a quantified expression is being restricted without having to access
it in a way that is cognitively parasitic on that very use of the expression’ (Hawthorne &
Manley, 2012, 140). As Hawthorne & Manley (2012, 210) point out, the non-redundancy con-
dition on demonstratives is just a refined candidness condition: if the audience is in a position
to grasp how the demonstrative is being restricted using salient supplemental information,
then clearly the audience is able to non-parasitically grasp how the demonstrative is being
restricted. Thus, Maximize Presupposition says that (44 b) should be preferred. However, as
we have seen, (44 a) is perfectly felicitous.
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(b) Every boy who danced with a girl kissed that girl.35
The proper semantic analysis of these constructions is a controversial matter,
and it is beyond the scope of this paper to give a detailed account of how
the relevant readings arise.36 However, I am hopeful that the sort of strategy
outlined in response to (44 a)-(44 b) could be helpful here too. That is, I want
to suggest that the acceptability of both (46 a) and (46 b) can be explained by
appealing to shifts in the implicit content associated with ‘girl’. Here is a rough
sketch of the general idea. When we interpret (46 a) the value of the definite’s
restrictor is, e.g. Ki: the set of girls kissed by i, where i is the relevant boy.
But when we interpret (46 b), the value of the demonstrative’s overt restrictor
is larger, perhaps the set of all girls. Instead, here it is the covert restrictor to
the demonstrative, X, that takes the value Ki. Thus, there is no contravention
of the Competition Principle, and supposing that each boy danced and kissed
exactly one girl, both (46 a) and (46 b) should be acceptable.37,38
35These cases are the definite and demonstrative counterparts of sentences such as (47):
(47) Every boy who danced with a girl kissed her.
Such constructions pose the following problem: the pronoun clearly isn’t referring to any
particular girl, and familiar ways of interpreting it as a variable bound by ‘a girl’ don’t give
the right truth-conditions. Put another way, the choice of girl seems to co-vary with the choice
of boy, but it is unclear how this reading is achieved given standard binding principles. The
literature on this topic is enormous: see (King & Lewis, 2016) for a survey; (Abbott, 2002)
contains a discussion of donkey demonstratives in particular.
36See, e.g. (Heim, 1990) and (Elbourne, 2005).
37In order to make these ideas precise, the covert structure that provides implicit content
will need to be more complex than simply a set variable. See fn.13.
38A reviewer suggests that even demonstratives that feature superlatives are acceptable
when they take donkey anaphoric readings:
(48) Every race organizer praised the fastest horse (in his race) and the jockey who
mounted that fastest horse.
This seems to raise the following problem: if ‘fastest horse’ invariably denotes a singleton
(supposing it denotes anything at all), then appealing to shifts in the value of the variable
that provides implicit content can’t explain why (48) is unproblematic. However, cases such
as (48) can be accounted for if an independently motivated entry for superlatives is adopted,
namely that of Herdan & Sharvit (2006). On this semantics, superlatives have a context
sensitive meaning that allows, e.g. ‘fastest horse’ to denote the set of horses each of which
are fastest in their respective race. That is, on this semantics ‘fastest horse’ needn’t denote a
singleton. We can then argue that the superlative denotes a singleton when it appears on the
definite in (48) (e.g. the singleton containing the unique fastest horse in the relevant race),
but does not denote a singleton when it appears on the demonstrative in (48) (e.g. the set of
horses each of which is fastest in their respective races). In this case, there is no problem for
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Finally, there are cases where it is uncontroversial that the overt argument
to the demonstrative denotes a singleton and yet the demonstrative is perfectly
felicitous. These are cases that involve postnominal modifiers. Such examples
have been discussed by Wolter (2006), Hawthorne & Manley (2012) and Nowak
(2018). Consider the contrast between (49 a)-(49 b), and (50 a)-(50 b):
(49) (a) ?? That tallest German will win the prize
(b) That man who is tallest among Germans will win the prize
(Hawthorne & Manley, 2012, 209, fn.19).
(c) The man who is tallest among Germans will win the prize.
(50) (a) ?? That author of Blood Meridian is a good writer.
(b) That guy who wrote Blood Meridian is a good writer [adapted from
(Nowak, 2015, 3)].
(c) The guy who wrote Blood Meridian is a good writer.
As my account predicts, the (a) members are unacceptable since their overt
arguments denote a singleton. However, my account also predicts that the (b)
members—both of which have a nominal modified by a relative clause—should
be unacceptable, since the (c) members are perfectly felicitous. But this is not
what we find.39
I think that these contrasts raise a real puzzle. However, I think that this
puzzle involves the functioning of postnominal modifiers rather than demonstra-
tives. To see this, note that postnominal modifiers seem to bring a counterex-
ample to Minimize Restrictors!:
(51) (a) ?? The tall author of Blood Meridian is a good writer.
the Competition Principle.
39Also see Wolter (2006, ch.4) for many examples of felicitous demonstratives that involve a
variety of postnominal modifiers. King’s (2001) ‘no demonstration no speaker reference’ uses
also all seem to involve postnominal modification.
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(b) The tall guy who wrote Blood Meridian is a good writer.
(c) The guy who wrote Blood Meridian is a good writer.
As predicted by Minimize Restrictors!, (51 a) is unacceptable. However, (51 b)
is felicitous which is surprising given that (51 c) is as well.40
It is unclear how best to explain these contrasts, and why postnominal mod-
ifiers exhibit this behavior.41 But it should be clear that, e.g. (49 a)-(49 c) do
not undermine my account. If anything these contrasts provide further support
for the sort of approach that I have developed here: the fact that postnominal
modifiers bring similar counterexamples to Minimize Restrictors! suggests that
my account is on the right track, and that there is a close relationship between
pthat Fq and pthe X Fq.42,43
40As Wolter (2006) observes, a similar contrast arises with free choice ‘any’:
(52) (a) ??Any man didn’t eat dinner.
(b) Any man who saw the fly in the food didn’t eat dinner (Dayal, 1998, 434-435).
An ‘any’ phrase can become acceptable when modified by a subordinate clause, e.g. a relative
clause—a phenomenon known as subtrigging (Dayal, 1998, 434).
41It is worth noting that Marty’s (2017) theory might be able to explain why postnominal
modifiers are able to disrupt the functioning of Minimize Restrictors!. Marty essentially derives
Minimize Restrictors! from the presence of a covert exhaustification operator. It is commonly
maintained that this operator is sensitive to the syntactic structure of its complement (Katzir,
2007). More specifically, the set of relevant alternatives is determined syntactically. It is
plausible that when postnominal modifiers are present, the set of alternatives is affected in
such a way that the relevant non-uniqueness effects no longer arise. If this is correct, then
our observations above would constitute a striking argument in favor of Marty’s account (and
accounts that try to derive Minimize Restrictors! through exhaustification more generally).
See (Blumberg, 2018) for further discussion.
42In response to contrasts such as (49 a)-(49 b), Nowak (2018) maintains that in some cases
involving postnominal modification the modifier may be attached high in the syntactic tree
(adopting the proposal of Bach & Cooper (1978)), so that the modifier takes the place of what
is usually the covert argument and the head noun takes the place of what is usually the overt
argument. This handles examples such as (49 b), since the head noun ‘man’ does not denote
a singleton without help from the relative clause ‘who is tallest among Germans’.
However, there are problems with this response. For one thing, the sort of movement it
posits is not possible on dominant theories of the syntax of postnominal modification (Bhatt,
2002). Moreover, this response still can’t handle cases such as the following:
(53) Most avid snow skiers remember that first black diamond run they attempted to ski
(King, 2001, 10).
Relative to a snow skier x , ‘first’ needs to take as argument ‘black diamond run x attempted
to ski’—the head noun can’t be separated from the rest of the clause. Finally, adopting a
non-standard syntax for postnominal modifiers does not explain the contrast between (51 a)
and (51 b): attaching the modifier high in the syntactic tree doesn’t alter the interpretation
of definite descriptions. However, it is plausible that the contrast between (51 a)-(51 b) and
(50 a)-(50 b) should be accounted for in the same way.
43Hawthorne & Manley briefly consider the problem of postnominal modifiers and maintain
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6 Elbourne (2008)
In this section, I discuss what is arguably the most sophisticated theory of
demonstratives in the literature, namely the account of Elbourne (2008). My
preferred semantics is similar to Elbourne’s account, and might even be consid-
ered a variant of it. However, my major aim here is to show that Elbourne’s
semantics on its own does not have the resources to explain the contrasts from
§1.
Building on work by Nunberg (1993), Elbourne (2008, 429-430) holds that
demonstrative determiners such as ‘that’ take three arguments: an individual
variable i, a relation variable R, and a noun-phrase. The first two arguments
are covert, while the third is overt. This yields the following configuration:
(54) [[[that i1] R2] NP]
The value of i is an individual that Elbourne calls the index, while the value of R
is a relation from individuals to things of the type of noun-phrases. Semantically,
‘that’ is given the following lexical entry:
(55) JthatK = λz ∈ De. λf ∈ D<e,et>. λg ∈ D<e,t> :
there is exactly one x such that f(z)(x) = g(x) = 1 ∧
z is distal from the speaker. the unique y such that f(z)(y) = g(y) = 144
that these modifiers should count as supplemental and automatically salient, and that what
matters is whether the head noun denotes a singleton. That is, the proposal is that felicitous
use of a demonstrative presupposes that the head noun does not denote a singleton without
help from additional material (either covert material or a postnominal modifier), and that this
additional material is salient. But notice that this response leads to further problems with
the principle of Maximize Presupposition. If relative clauses are supplemental and automat-
ically salient, then Maximize Presupposition predicts that sentences such as (49 c) should be
unacceptable, since (49 b) involves stronger presuppositions because it contains a demonstra-
tive. Thus, Maximize Presupposition says that (49 b) should be preferred. However, (49 c) is
perfectly felicitous.
44What is given is a simplification of Elbourne’s entry, since he works in a situation semantics
where each type is ‘raised’ by an intensional parameter, e.g. the type of a noun-phrase is
〈se, st〉 rather than 〈e, t〉. See (Elbourne, 2008, 429-430) for the details, and see below for a
potential problem with trying to reconcile Elbourne’s situation semantics with the pragmatic
mechanism presented in §5.
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In words, what (55) says is that ‘that’ takes an individual z (the index), a
relation f (the value of R), and a function g (the value of the the overt noun-
phrase), and returns a unique individual x that satisfies the following conditions:
f(z)(x) = 1 (i.e. z bears the relation f to x ), g(x) = 1 (i.e. x has the property
g), and z is distant from the speaker (at the relevant point of evaluation).45
To see how this account is supposed to work, let us run through a few cases.
Perhaps it is best to begin with a case of deferred ostension such as (2) from
above:
(2) [Pointing to a copy of On Denoting ] That man was a genius.
According to Elbourne, a simplified LF for (2) is given by (57):
(57) [[[[that i1] R2] man] was a genius]
Here, the index is the particular copy of On Denoting that I am pointing to,
while the value of R relates books to their authors:
(58) (a) Ji1K
g = a copy of On Denoting
(b) JR2K
g = λx ∈ De. λy ∈ De. y authored x
(c) JR2 i1K
g = λy ∈ De. y authored On Denoting
Thus, on Elbourne’s account (2) is defined just in case there is exactly one
individual who authored On Denoting and is a man, and the particular copy
of On Denoting is distant from the speaker. If defined, (2) is true just in case
Bertrand Russell, i.e. the man who authored On Denoting, is a genius.
45Notice that on this account it is the index, and not the denotation of the demonstrative
that determines the distal feature. This is in order to account for cases such as the following
(Nunberg, 1993, 23). Suppose I point to two sample plates in my china shop. The first one is
right in front of me, but the second is across the room. I say:
(56) These [I gesture at the nearby plate] are over at the warehouse, but those [I gesture at
the distant plate] I have in stock here.
If the denotations and not the indices of ‘these’ and ‘those’ were what was relevant here, then
I should have used the one where I used the other.
31
Now consider a deictic use of a demonstrative, such as (1):
(1) [Pointing at Pete] That man plays tennis.
The index in this case is Pete, while the value of R is the identity relation:
(59) (a) Ji1K
g = Pete
(b) JR2K
g = λx ∈ De. λy ∈ De. y = x
(c) JR2 i1K
g = λy ∈ De. y = Pete
Thus, on Elbourne’s account (1) is defined just in case there is exactly one
individual who is a man and is identical to Pete, and Pete is distant from the
speaker. If defined, (1) is true just in case Pete plays tennis.46
It should be clear that the semantics presented in §5.2 is very similar to
Elbourne’s theory. The major difference is that Elbourne’s account is more
complex: it posits an additional covert argument and also makes use of a distal
feature. Now, it might be thought that this increased complexity allows us to
account for the relevant contrasts. More specifically, it might be thought that
our contrasts can be explained by putting constraints on what can and can’t
play the role of indices and relations. To motivate this, consider once again one
of our target contrasts:
(9 a) The author of Blood Meridian also wrote The Road .
(9 b) ??That author of Blood Meridian also wrote The Road .
As we have seen, on Elbourne’s account a demonstrative has a semantic value
only if there exists an index for the individual variable. It could be argued
that when, e.g. (9 b) is uttered out of the blue there are simply no suitable
46Elbourne (2008, 434-435) uses a system that involves assigning situation pronouns to
predicates, and captures the rigidity of deictically used demonstratives by appealing to an
operator that shifts the assigned situation pronoun to the actual world.
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individuals that could play the role of indices. So, it might be maintained that
Elbourne’s account explains why (9 b) should be infelicitous.
However, even when I utter (9 b) while pointing at Cormac McCarthy it is
still infelicitous. Assuming that the index is the man Cormac McCarthy in this
case, and the relevant relation is just the identity relation, (9 b) will be virtually
semantically identical to (9 a). Since the latter is acceptable, it is difficult to
see why the former should be infelicitous. More generally, given Elbourne’s
treatment of deictically used demonstratives, it is unclear why any of (9 b)-
(12 b) should be infelicitous when their demonstratives are used deictically.
To sum up, I don’t think that our target contrasts can be explained by main-
taining that appropriate arguments for the demonstrative determiner are un-
available. Thus, Elbourne’s account as it stands cannot help to explain these
contrasts. However, so long as Elbourne’s theory is construed broadly enough,
i.e as in (55), there is no bar to him supplementing it with the pragmatic mech-
anism that I presented in §5.
Although I think that Elbourne would do well to adopt my pragmatic account
presented above, I want to end this section by bringing out a tension between
some features of Elbourne’s preferred semantic framework and the Competition
Principle.47 To see this, recall our observation in §5.3 that in some cases it
appeared that pthe Fq and pthat Fq are both acceptable, in contravention of
the Competition Principle. Our response to this worry was to maintain that
the implicit content associated with the DP was different in each example, so
that the meaning of the covertly supplemented overt noun-phrase differed across
cases.
The problem for Elbourne involves examples such as the following:
(60) (a) Mary talked to no senator before that senator was lobbied
47Thanks to Cian Dorr for discussion here.
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(Elbourne, 2008, 445-446).
(b) Mary talked to no senator before the senator was lobbied.
Both of these sentences are acceptable. However, Elbourne’s chosen seman-
tic framework is a situation semantics where quantifiers are essentially able to
bind the variables that provide implicit content to DPs. For instance, putting
technical details to one side, in (60 a)-(60 b) the “covariation” of senators that
were lobbied with those that Mary talked to is captured by allowing the quan-
tifier ‘no senator’ to bind the variable that provides implicit content to ‘that
senator’/‘the senator’ (Elbourne, 2008, 445-446). This means that the implicit
content associated with the demonstrative in, e.g., (60 a) and the definite in
(60 b) cannot be distinguished. Thus, Elbourne cannot explain why both (60 a)
and (60 b) are acceptable by appealing to differences in implicit content, i.e. he
cannot make use of the strategy that we employed in §5.3. But if Elbourne
adopts the Competition Principle, then some such explanation must be given,
for the demonstrative and the definite will be in competition here.48
Of course, it is not compulsory to have quantifiers behave as they do in
Elbourne’s framework. However, this approach to quantification is arguably
the centrepiece of Elbourne’s account of “donkey” phenomena that involve so-
called cases of “covariation without c-command”. So, giving it up would require
a rather large departure from his chosen system. I leave how to reconcile the
Competition Principle with Elbourne’s preferred semantic framework as an open
issue.
48A similar problem arises with cases of donkey anaphoric demonstratives, e.g. (46 b) (‘Ev-
ery boy who danced with a girl kissed that girl’).
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7 Conclusion
There are considerable challenges for those who wish to provide a unified account
of complex demonstratives: an adequate theory needs to allow demonstratives
to behave like definite descriptions in some cases, but also pattern differently
from definite descriptions in others. In this paper, I focused on the latter chal-
lenge. I put forward a pragmatic account of the target contrasts that builds on
an economy principle discussed by Schlenker (2005). I also argued that my pre-
ferred approach does better than the most sophisticated existing theories with
respect to these contrasts.
I believe that the approach to demonstratives presented in this paper is on the
right track. However, there is still much work to be done on this topic. Hopefully
the data that we have discussed here will be helpful for future research, and the
positive proposal presented above will provide a basis for further inquiry.
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